FlowSafe
From MozillaWiki
FlowSafe: Information Flow Security for the Browser
The central idea is to improve the default browser security model, which is "stuck" since 1995 at the Same-Origin Policy with its underlying and conflicting DOM access control and JavaScript object-capability security layers.
We aim to do this without breaking the web, and indeed with measurable improvements to safety property enforcement and security policy expressiveness.
Goals
- Improve default cross-site script integrity (ads, analytics)
- Systematically enforce the Same-Origin Policy and better security policies by pervasive mediation
- Reduce existing "caps", DOM, and JavaScript engine patch-work / leaky reference monitor code
- Guarantee termination-insensitive non-interference for better confidentiality
- Explore timing and termination channel mitigations
To-do
Implement dynamic-only, fail-stop "no sensitive upgrade" or better, information flow security for JS, the DOM, and other parts of the browser. See this paper on part of the work.
- Add
JSTrustLabel
to the JS API, a union ofJSPrincipals
(trust labels replace principals) -
JSScript
has aJSTrustLabel
- Interpreter
pc
has aJSTrustLabel
- Extend
JSExtendedClass
to delegatetypeof
so we can buildLabeledValue
wrappers for primitives- Also need to rebox results of all primitive operators, e.g.
-x
forx = new LabeledValue(42)
should be aLabeledValue
instance, not the number-42
- Also need to rebox results of all primitive operators, e.g.
- Have shapes imply trust labels so that distinct origins get different shapes for standard objects, equivalent property list patterns, etc.
- So objects have trust labels because objects have shapes
- Beware shapeless objects (dense arrays, certain "host objects")
- Cormac's semantics requires labeled references too, another use-case for
LabeledValue
- Add policy JS API that allows custom assignment, control flow branching, and input/output policy decision points -- does this mean SSA in one pass?
- Add shell functions for testing and write tests
- DOM, other host objects have trust labels
- Exceptions, etc.
- Declassify primitive TBD, defer for now
--Brendan 01:43, 31 October 2009 (UTC)
References
Efficient Purely-Dynamic Information Flow Analysis (PLAS '09)