Security/Reviews/CloudServices/Marketplace Payments

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Status

Identity (TEMPLATE)
Tracker Bug -
Stage Definition
Status Green (Green, Yellow, Red?)
Release Target
Health -
Status Note -

Team

Product manager / Feature manager Lindsay Saunders, Stephanie Turner and Caitlin Galimidi.
Engineering lead
Engineering manager Payments - Andy McKay

Marketplace -

Security lead Adam Muntner
Privacy lead
Localization lead Peiying Mo
Accessibility lead -
QA lead Krupa Raj
UX lead Elizabeth Hunt
Product marketing lead
Additional members Amy Tsay - Community

Scott DeVaney - Editorial Manager

Open issues/risks

Stage 1: Definition

Introduction

Payments tied to Firefox Accounts as a reusable service with all Mozilla properties


Project Links

Project Links - Mana pages (Mozilla staff/contrib LDAP account needed)

Project Links - Receipt Verification

API Docs


Related

Historical examples of app payment fraud

Use Cases

Webpay is an implementation of the WebPaymentProvider spec. It hosts the payment flow inside navigator.mozPay() when making app purchases or in-app payments on Firefox OS.

  • Webpay provides a REST API for clients to interact with the server.
  • All API’s use JSON for request and responses.

Data Flows

Diagrams

Payments Flow Sequence

Pay Flow Sequence.png

Payments Data Flow Diagram

PaymentsDFD.jpg

Pin Flow

Pin-flow.png
(Note: Persona was replaced with FxA)

Architecture Diagram

Top-level architecural view

Mkt layers.png

Payment Systems Diagram

Payment Systems diagram - by Wil Clouser


Logical diagram of Payments application services architecture.

Diagram Key

The dotted line from a red service goes to a breakout describing the logical components of its service stack. This is a logical diagram, it does not represent the deployed physical network or server architecture.

Starting from a Red Services box,

  • Solid line represents dependency/backend component relationships
  • Dotted lines point to breakouts describing the logical components of a service stack
Mozilla Services
Component Name Description Documentation URLs
DB1 Example Example
Solitude A server for processing payments for Mozilla’s Marketplace and Add-ons site. Project Documentation - http://readthedocs.org/docs/solitude/en/latest/
Sourcecode - https://github.com/mozilla/solitude
Webpay Webpay is an implementation of the WebPaymentProvider spec
Spartacus is a single page app front-end for Webpay. 		Webpay Sourcecode - https://github.com/mozilla/webpay
Spartacus Sourcecode - https://github.com/mozilla/spartacus
External Services
Component Name Description Documentation URLs
3rd Party Developers Example Example
Bango Example Example
Firefox Accounts Example Documentation - https://wiki.mozilla.org/Identity/Firefox_Accounts


Security Review - https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Reviews/B2G/FirefoxAccounts

Marketplace Webheads Example Example
Proxy Example Example

Stage 2: Design

Threat Model

ID Title Threat Proposed Mitigations Threat Agent Rating Likelihood Impact Notes
1 malicious access to apps device If a phone is stolen or given to a friend/family member, it is possible for that person to make purchases. A PIN is to be implemented that is required for purchases and in-app purchases. CEF logging on transactions to track excessive purchases. Incident response to deal wiht stolen phone. Malicious User 12 3 4 – Reputation In other systems (i.e. iOS, this i a configured parameter.
2 Malicious extension could steal authentication credentials A rogue extension could possibly steal credentials or cause transactions to happen. A PIN is to be implemented that is required for purchases and in-app purchases. CEF logging on transactions to track excessive purchases. Incident response to deal with stolen credentials. Malicious Developer 12 3 4 – Reputation Must be registered with marketplace.
3 Malicious App creates fake iframe An app could create an iframe in order to overlay a purchase iframe. CEF logging on transactions to track excessive purchases. Incident response to deal with stolen credentials. Malicious App 12 3 4 – Reputation
4 Malicious App creates fake iframe An app could create an iframe in order to overlay a purchase iframe. CEF logging on transactions to track excessive purchases. Incident response to deal with stolen credentials. Paypal account shows all purchases. Malicious App 12 3 4 – Reputation
5 XSS vuln could allow malicious user to force purchase If a XSS is found in the marketplace, this could be used to force a purchase. CSP is enabled on Payments. CEF logging on transactions to track excessive purchases. Incident response to deal with stolen credentials. Paypal account shows all purchases. Malicious App 12 3 4 – Reputation
6 CSRF could force purchase. If a XSS is found in the marketplace, this could be used to force a purchase. CSRF protection token on the marketplace site. CEF logging on transactions to track excessive purchases. Incident response to deal with stolen credentials. Malicious App 12 3 4 – Reputation
7 Compromise web heads The attacker could then leverage their access to attack other parts of the application environment or to serve arbitrary/manipulated content to users. Mitigation possibilities are being discussed. System access 12 3 4 – Reputation
8 Appplication Theft The attacker could begin a payment, cancel the payment, and craft a postback to the app server, fooling it into thinking the cancelled payment was successful. (BID 1145024) Bug detected, application patched. System access 12 3 4 – Reputation
9 Appplication Theft The attacker could modify the JWT for payment to craft $0 payment that executes successfully. (BID 1145024) Bug detected, application patched. System access 12 3 4 – Reputation


User Interactions

Payment flow user interactions for

  • Marketplace App Payment Flows
  • In-App Payment Flows
Marketplace App Payment Flows

Payments flows are initiated from the Marketplace which is under Mozilla’s control

A. Desktop
ID Actions Element
1. Pre-provider flows PIN creation/enter/reset etc (Same domain as marketplace) Popup
2. Provider payment entry Popup, page hosted by payment provider
3. Communication with popup Javascript library: fxpay
B. Firefox OS / Android
ID Actions Element
1. Pre-provider flows PIN creation/enter/reset etc (Same domain as marketplace) Trusted UI
2. Provider payment entry Trusted UI, page hosted by payment provider
3. Open and communicate with Trusted UI JavaScript platform function: navigator.mozPay()
4. Open and communicate with MozPay JavaScript library: fxpay
In-App Payment Flows

Payment flows are initiated from 3rd party app domains - Mozilla no control over the apps or domains. They have been approved by and have a payments account on the Marketplace, but can change their code at any time (for hosted apps).

A. Desktop
ID Actions Element
1. Pre-provider flows PIN creation/enter/reset etc (3rd party app domain) Popup, page hosted by payment provider
2. Provider payment entry Popup, page hosted by payment provider
3. Communication with popup Javascript payments library run from 3rd party app domain: fxpay
B. Firefox OS / Android
ID Actions Element
1. Pre-provider flows PIN creation/enter/reset etc (Same domain as marketplace) Trusted UI
2. Provider payment entry Trusted UI, page hosted by payment provider
3. Open and communicate with Trusted UI JavaScript platform function: navigator.mozPay()
4 Open and communicate with MozPay JavaScript library: fxpay

Security Recommendations / Open Issues

ID Title Status Summary
[[1]] Title Status(Open/Closed) Summary.
[[2]] Title Status(Open/Closed) Summary.

CEF Logging Requirements

Authentication

  • bad password provided at login (or anywhere where user is prompted for auth)
  • bad username provided at login
  • account created
  • password changed
  • password reset requested
  • new privileged (e.g. reviewer, admin, etc) account created
  • account modified and granted additional rights (e.g. reviewer, admin, etc)

Authorization

Denial of Service

Request Specific

Input Validation Exceptions

File Upload

  • Large number of file uploads
  • Attempt to upload something other than expected file

Privacy Risk Analysis

(Status of and link to privacy review and outcome here)

Stage 3: Planning

Application Security Requirements

It is expected that the Secure Coding Guidelines is followed but these requirements are especially important for this application.

CSP Content Security Policy in blocking mode.

Password Requirements

  • Threshold based CAPTCHA for login Restrict password guesses without CAPTCHA to 5.
  • Blacklist top bad passwords that could be selected by a user.

Account Requirements

  • Allow users to view last login time and IP address after authentication

Coding Requirements

  • Session based CSRF protection (e.g. not Django cookie based CSRF protection)
  • Clickjacking (x-frame-options) and XSS protection (CSP)

Other Requirements

  • Uploaded links must be verified against google safe browsing list (real time or daily cron)
  • Uploaded images must be strictly checked to validate only images are uploaded. More Info

SSL Requirements

  • SSL is required to the connection to paypal (user redirects and any backend connections)
  • The SSL cert must be strictly validated (specific code needed for backend connections)
  • HSTS must be enabled
  • No HTTP pages. Full HTTPS
  • Third party connections (e.g. twitter, facebook, paypal, etc) must link to the HTTPS page for that site. That may require rewriting the widget (twitter specifically)

Operation Security Requirements

Document network/platform security requirements here (e.g. IDS concerns, firewall changes, system hardening reqs, etc)

Critical Security Requirements

Itemize individual security blockers here. Reference components in section AppSec or OpSec subsections. These blockers must be addressed before the product can go live.

Stage 4: Development

Repeatable Security Test Cases

Document individual repeatable security test cases here. Include a reference to the source repo, and documentation that governs how to execute test cases.

Secure Coding Guidelines

Document specific secure coding guidelines to be followed and relate them to specific issues/requirements that are specified; capture bug ids related to those issues.

Code Review Milestones

Table 1 - itemized list of code review milestones {i.e. breakdown of specific components that will be reviewed} Table 2 - list of app components/modules that should trigger additional security review (e.g. auth, csrf, file upload handling, etc)

Stage 5: Release

Application Security Verification

These subsections should contain a list of the steps to be taken, and the status of each activity

Code Review

Automated Security Testing

  • Minion scanner

Manual Security Testing

Operational Security Verification

ArcSight Information

Network Design Security Review

Database Security Review

Platform Security (Hardening & Specific Config Requirements)

Landing Criteria

This should be a table itemizing everything from Stage 3 - Critical Security Requirements, including status. For status Red=Unimplemented,Yellow=implemented,Green=tested and passed?

Stage 6: Post Implementation Review

Production Security Considerations

Document additional/ongoing work for this application (e.g. specific things to watch for in ArcSight, gaming behaviour, etc)

Post Implementation Tasks

Itemize process/kb changes developed from this project (e.g. secure coding guidelines, policy stuff, etc)


Team status notes

status notes
Products tbd -
Engineering tbd -
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