13
edits
Changes
small note on hierarchy preferences, link to other page, hack at will
* If a CA allows the use of internationalized domain names (IDNs) in certificates (e.g., as issued for SSL/TLS-enabled servers), the CA should address the issue of homographic spoofing of IDNs in their CP/CPS, even if primary responsibility for dealing with this issue falls on domain registries. (This doesn't mean that the CAs must prevent such spoofing. It merely means that a CA should describe how it handles the issue of spoofing when authenticating the owner of a domain.)
* A hierarchical structure of a single root with intermediate certs (subroots) is preferred. The single top-level root's public certificate is supplied for Mozilla's root list; the subroots are not. See [[CA:Recommendations_for_Roots]]
==== Notes for future work ====
