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Apps/Security

No change in size, 20:55, 22 March 2012
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#The store can also entrust other stores with the power to grant permissions (possibly a subset of permissions, or not privileged permissions)
=== Distribution / management of WebApps ===
# It should not be trivially easy for a rogue application to be listed on a marketplace / store
# The development and release history of an application, including the identity of the developer, should be fully accountable.
# A store may revoke a bad / malicious WebApp
# A user may revoke a bad / malicious WebApp.
# A store may not install ("push") apps onto a device without the user's expressed and explicit permission
# A user may remove any app at any time.
# A telco can decide which stores to implicitly trust on devices that they sell. (an analogy in debian packaging terms is that the telco sets the initial contents of the /etc/apt/sources.list file)
# A user must be able to override the stores which they decide to implicity trust on their devices. (an analogy in debian packaging terms is that the user should be free to ''change'' the contents of the /etc/apt/sources.list file)
# The distribution of applications must scale to mass-volume proportions (100 million or more phones; 1 million or more store-distributed application downloads or updates per day)
# The development of applications must be straightforward, and rapid development cycles must be easy.
# The security measures chosen to underpin the distribution of applications through stores must not interfere with, or make awkward, the development of applications.
# The development of applications by any developer must not interfere with or compromise the security measures or the distribution of applications through stores.
# A developer's application should not, through any technical measure, technical limitation or design flaw in the security model, be restricted to sole and exclusive distribution through any one given and specific store.
=== Management / granting of API permissions to WebApps ===
== Requirements ==
=== Distribution / management of WebApps ===
# It should not be trivially easy for a rogue application to be listed on a marketplace / store
# The development and release history of an application, including the identity of the developer, should be fully accountable.
# A store may revoke a bad / malicious WebApp
# A user may revoke a bad / malicious WebApp.
# A store may not install ("push") apps onto a device without the user's expressed and explicit permission
# A user may remove any app at any time.
# A telco can decide which stores to implicitly trust on devices that they sell. (an analogy in debian packaging terms is that the telco sets the initial contents of the /etc/apt/sources.list file)
# A user must be able to override the stores which they decide to implicity trust on their devices. (an analogy in debian packaging terms is that the user should be free to ''change'' the contents of the /etc/apt/sources.list file)
# The distribution of applications must scale to mass-volume proportions (100 million or more phones; 1 million or more store-distributed application downloads or updates per day)
# The development of applications must be straightforward, and rapid development cycles must be easy.
# The security measures chosen to underpin the distribution of applications through stores must not interfere with, or make awkward, the development of applications.
# The development of applications by any developer must not interfere with or compromise the security measures or the distribution of applications through stores.
# A developer's application should not, through any technical measure, technical limitation or design flaw in the security model, be restricted to sole and exclusive distribution through any one given and specific store.
== Proposals ==
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