Thunderbird:OpenPGP:Status

-- planned for 78.x --

• automatic scanning of received emails for potential correspondent keys

• automated unit tests for the Thunderbird integration

• test if we're vulnerable to known security attacks

-- unknown schedule --

• keyserver uploading

• notify the user if their key will expire in the next months

• sending an INLINE cleartext signed message without attachments (we don't intend to support sending other kinds of inline OpenPGP messages)

• sign (certify) someone else's key if a key is marked as verified

• Should strip keys (to minimize their size) when sending the user's own public key as an attachment

• an option to disable subject encryption

• performing secret key generation in a nicer way (currently the UI will block while the key generation is working)

• an optional mode to automatically encrypt "if possible" without requiring the user to manually enable it for the individual message (if the user has accepted and valid keys for all receipients of a message)

• actions for message filtering

• automatic detection if a correspondent’s key has been already been signed (certified) by one of the user’s secret keys (in this case, we should automatically give it acceptance status “verified”)

• potentially consume and send autocrypt gossip information

-- done between 78.0.1 and 78.2.0 --

• use better defaults for new key generation

• shouldn't notify the user about attached key if the same key has already been imported

• account preferenes allow importing an existing key

• modifying the expiration date of a key

• importing revocations

• ambiguity warning when more than one recipient key is available (e.g. unexpected / changed key)

• automatic scanning of received emails for expiration changes and revocations

• backup of secret keys,

• saving encrypted drafts

• remembering encryption/signature configuration in a draft message

• partially done: allow distributing sender's key with the autocrypt header mechanism (if sender key has a simple structure)

• optional for advanced users: use a secret key that's stored on a gnupg smartcard (GPGME API) or managed by the Qubes OS Split GPG System, and use it for decrypting and signing a message

-- done in 78.0 --

• account preferences allow creating and configuring a key with a better UI, and viewing details of personal keys

• migration of Enigmail settings -> NOT in thundebird, but provided by an updated Enigmail Add-on, that performs migration, only

• reject messages with missing MDC

• key import (only by manually exporting from gnupg, then importing the file in thunderbird)

• give feedback if key discovery got not result

• better handling of importing keys, give feedback on failure

• fix linux dependencies, support older distributions

-- done in 77 or earlier --

• integrated RNP library

• internal key store in TB profile directory (not to be shared)

• secret keys protected with an automatic passphrase, optionally protected using TB's master password

• manually generating a new secret key (which automatically saves a revocation certificate and stores it in the user's profile directory)

• manually importing secret keys from a backup file (e.g. one created by gnupg and exported using gpg --armor --export-secret-keys). The key needs to be unlocked at import time, and will be protected with a random password as described above

• manually importing a public key from a file, or from an URL, or from an email attachment

• end-to-end encryption preferences for an email account that covers both OpenPGP and S/MIME

• sending of OpenPGP messages is configured by selecting the user's preferred OpenPGP key in account preferences (an appropriate key, with a matching email address, must have been manually imported already, or already have been generated inside TB)

• message composition: selection of the encryption technology to be used (either S/MIME or OpenPGP) while composing a message

• manually enabling encryption or digital signature while composing a message, and attaching your own public key

• decryption and verification of received messages, including status icons for the encryption status and/or digital signature status

• detailed message security info for received messages, open by clicking on status icon

• a mechanism that allows the user to manually define the validity of a public key. We're (at least temporarily) using the term "Acceptance" for that, to indicate that it's a user decision, whether a key is accepted or not. Before TB will accept a correspondent's public key, it's necessary to use the "OpenPGP Key Manager", find the appropriate key and open the key details (either double-click, or select menu View / Key Properties, or press CTRL-I). In order to allow that a key is used for sending encrypted messages, one of the "Yes" choices needs to be selected. The choice is remembered inside TB's storage.

• The signature status shown for a received message depends on the validity setting the user has made.

• The key details view shows the full list of all certifications on the key, even those from keys which are unavailable (Enigmail filtered the list to only show certifications from available keys).

• The key details view shows the structure of the key

• send encrypted subject (on by default)

• we automatically enable signing, if the user manually enables the encryption flag for an email (this automatism could be made configurable later)

• we automatically attach the user's own public key, if signing is enabled

• discoverable sender key that's attached using the autocrypt header mechanism, support to manual import of email

• if unavailable, allow the user to start an Internet search (WKD and keys.openpgp.org) for the key a correspondent used to sign their message (necessary for verifying a signature)

• allow the user to start an Internet search for a correspondents key (WKD and keys.openpgp.org), using a popop menu command on from/to/cc entries when reading any email.

• keyserver / WKD retrieval from within email composer

• assistance to resolve missing recipient keys when composing an email

• initial preparation for supporting GnuPG smartcards for secret key operations (decryption works, need to enable pref mail.openpgp.allow_external_gnupg)

• we don't intend to enable the encryption feature automatically, user needs to discover the feature and enable it on their own (by configuring their personal key)
• we don't plan to automatically accept keys that we receive, regardless of mechanism. Users must accept keys of other people before they are used, to encourage them to verify their correctness.